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Universite de Montreal 
This article presents results of a case study based on a proposed implemen- 
tation within a large franchised merchandising operation. Among findings are 
that the organization is characterized by a loosely coupled communication 
system. Attitudes were generally found to be positive, although respondents 
exhibited limited knowledge of the technology. A complex mixture of 
franchiser-franchisee relations is discovered. The article concludes with an 
argument for greater attention to the development of communication theory. 
Cet article prCsente les r6sultat.s d'une Ctude de cas concernant le projet 
d'informatisation d'un dseau de hchises.  Nous constatons en analysant les 
donnh  que l'organisation CtudiCe est caractCrisk par: un systi3me de 
communication faiblement intCgrC, des attitudes positives envers 
l'informatisation, bien qu'h cet Cgard les connaissances et l'exp6rience des 
acteurs sont plut6t limiths, et fmalement des relations franchiseur-franchisb 
pour le moins complexes. En conclusion, les auteurs insistent sur la n&essitC 
de mieux poser la problCmatique de l'informatisation sur une thbrie de la 
communication plus nche. 
Introduction: Breaking with the Decontextualized, A Historic View 
of Organization 
Much of the conceptual basis for contemporary thinking about the computerization of 
work takes the form of an idealization: that of a "normal" office situation. As long as 
we treat this idealization as an incontrovertible premiss, it may seem plausible to speak 
of the "functions" of the new communication and information-processing technolo- 
gies, as if such functions existed largely without variation across most situations. 
Indeed it is probably only by introducing such an idealization that general planning 
strategies applicable to a wide range of contexts can be made to take on an appearance 
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of rationality. By and large, the literature on office automation has been found to be 
based on this convenient abstraction (Katambwe, 1987; Taylor, forthcoming; Taylor 
& Katambwe, 1988). 
The work to be reported in this article has been guided by a different conviction, 
namely that the unidimensional conceptualization of the abstract object commonly 
called an "office" serves largely to foster an illusion-the kind of illusion on which to 
base an advertising campaign, for example. While there is perhaps no harm, for 
rhetorical purposes, in thinking of the administrative workplace by the introduction of 
an "ideal type" abstraction, such an idealization is a singularly poor starting place for 
understanding the implementational dynamics which go into actual experiences in 
computerization, as real people in real situations have to live through them. It also 
represents an inadequate basis for planning such an implementation. 
We have thus made a number of core assumptions in our work which are essential 
to an understanding of the results of research to be reported in this article. We take it 
as given, among other things, that: 
1. Every office (and every organization) has a fundamentally contingent charac- 
ter (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), in that its patterns of behavior and its culture 
reflect the particular circumstances that presided at its formation, and are 
operative in its current environment; 
2. While, in this general sense, the assumption that organizations have stable 
properties can be justified, many organizations nevertheless evolve perceptibly 
over time, such evolution being a potent source of internal tension, and even 
conflict; 
3. Not only do particular organizations change their structure and behavior over 
time (particularly during periods of rapid growth), but it is also possible to 
observe evolution in modal organizational forms (Stinchcombe, 1965), and the 
conceptual models that serve as metaphors for them (Morgan, 1986), from one 
generation to another, such prevailing models having a strongly prescriptive, 
legitimizing effect in determining what is considered acceptable, and what is 
not, at any give time; 
4. Once adopted, an organizational pattern is not only a) a utilitarian division of 
labor, for the more efficient conduct of the organization's main work, it is also 
b) a mosaic of situated professional practices (with their associated images of 
the proper conduct of work and the nature of the professional status and 
personality), c) a confederation of more or less tightly knit work communities, 
each with its own local culture (Suchman, 1987). all linked together in a more 
or lessloosely coupled (Weick, 1976; Weick, 1982; Weick, 1985) transorgani- 
zational networkof communication (with attendant problems of coordination), 
and d) a differentiated political structure (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977), charac- 
erized by apattern of rights and duties, supportedby legitimating understandings 
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having a more or less explicit contractual basis, and involving internal com- 
petition for the spoils of enterprise, however mitigated their explicit manifesta- 
tion may be. There are thus several logics at work, not necessarily all 
mutually compatible. 
Innovation, in such a universe, is a complex event, which requires local as well as 
global adaptation, a reshaping of the professional's image of his or her own role and 
status, a repatterning of day-to-day interaction, and political negotiation. In this sense, 
our work breaks with a second widely held image to be found in much of the office 
computerization literature: which pictures the technological innovation event as quite 
straightforward, requiring only the evaluation of user needs, a scanning of the available 
product options, a system design by a team of experts, and support and training for the 
user community during the implementation phase. Our view of the process is less tidy: 
we tend to conceive of it as taking longer than anyone initially expects, having 
numerous false starts, almost always based on incomplete or inaccurate information, 
much more involved with politics than is generally imagined and much less technically 
self-assured. We see the introduction of computerization as posing risks for profes- 
sional status, upsetting established work patterns and raising political issues of 
considerable depth. Similarly, we take it to be problematical to what extent such 
secondary implications figure in the ultimate outcome of the attempted innovation. 
The report of research which follows should thus be considered a contribution to 
a more contextualist, situation-dependent theory of technological innovation than has 
often marked the literature on the subject. In this sense, our work can be thought of as 1 figuring as a component within arecent move (Collective, 1988; Greif, 1988) to M e  
the issue of technological innovation as a question of Computer Supported Cooperative 1 Work (CSCW), rather than Nust  one more step in the assembly-line industrialization 
of work, or an extension of automation into new fields of production, i.e., as an 1 "information-processing" activity, subject to the same rules as other production 1 processes. 
Our work also breaks with another common assumption in the computerization 
literature, insofar as the latter conceives of the role of the social scientist in the 
implementation process (when, indeed, it foresees any role at all) to be limited to 1) 
contributions to the measurement of "needs" and 2) the assessment of "impacts" or 
"effects". Such a conception assumes that the technology is already in its definitive 
form when it has traversed the phases of R&D, manufacturing and technical design 
(including in-house tailoring conducted by the systems group to fit local circum- 
stances). We believe, by contrast, that no technology actually becomes a technology 
until it has been put to work by a community of users, and hence, that the actual 
character of a given technology cannotbe determined by the specifications on the box: 
its definition is necessarily contingent on the circumstances of its implementation. 
From this assumption follows a quite different notion of the role of the researcher, in 
that we take it for granted that the planning and implementation process is (or should 
be, in any case) incremental and interactive, involving both systems engineers and the 
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user community. The role of research, in this view, is pro-active and mediatory, in that 
its objective is to arrive eventually at a definition of the organization's technology, and 
not to presuppose it. The further implication of this philosophy of research is to make 
the researcher a partner in an implementation enterprise, in conjunction with the host 
organization, which has elements of both intervention and of research, and which 
requires on-going negotiation of both relations and results, during the entire stay of the 
research team3 
A research project having these properties has recently been termed a "naturalistic 
inquiry" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Its methodology has traditionally been classified 
under the heading of "case study". As such, its approach is necessarily interpretative 
(Pumam & Pacanowsky, 1983) although, as we shall see in the case of an extended 
network, the actual methods used may be both quantitative and qualitative. 
Characteristics of the Study Situation 
Organizations come in all shapes and sizes. Within the context of our own research 
programme, we have elected to focus our attention primarily on a kind of organization 
which has become increasingly prominent in the contemporary economy and which 
has been called, variously, a value-adding partnership, a cluster organization, or a 
constellation. While these terms are by no means completely synonymous, and while 
the phenomenon to which they refer covers a wide spectrum of enterpreneurial 
ventures, they all share in common one property: multiple nodes of entrepreneurship 
joined in a network arrangement which allows them to act like a single fm, driven by 
the pressure to compete when confronted by large-scale unitary companies who 
threaten to dominate the market. Probably the best-known exemplar of this form of 
organization is the franchising operation. 
Our choice of franchising operations for a site of research has been dictated by two 
considerations. For one thing, the properties of organization described above which 
most distinctly contribute to its contingent character, including the continued exis- 
tence of local professional values, the loosely coupled networking of local work 
cultures and head office operations, and the visible pattern of a political structure, all 
within the context of both explicitly negotiated and implicitly understood contractual 
arrangements, are exactly those whose effects on the capacity to innovate we want to 
better understand. We assume these to be factors present in every organization, but 
they tend to stand out more starkly in a franchise operation, and make research easier 
to focus. The second consideration is of a slightly different order. Some observers, 
believe (Taylor, forthcoming) that the current discernible move to an information- 
driven economy is encouraging the progressive substitution of such value-adding 
partnerships or cluster organizations for more conventional quasi-bureaucratic struc- 
tures, and thus any understanding we can gain of their dynamics may be of help in 
comprehending elements of the larger question of the impact of computerization on 
organizational life generally (an issue to which we will return briefly in our conclu- 
sion). 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONIVol.15 No. 314 35 
The franchise-based organization (for a more detailed analysis see Lafrance & 
Girard, 1989) works on a bipolar principle, linking a central company, the franchiser, 
to a network of smaller operators, the franchisees, with the franchiser holding rights to 
the company's name (in effect, its letters patent), and to a product or product line 
carrying its name, or trade mark. The franchisee operates a point of sale, part of the 
network, for which he or she has normally paid an entry fee which bestows an 
entitlement to unique distributorship for the company's products over a given tenitory 
and to the setting up of operations under the company's banner, with all the advertising 
benefits which accrue therefrom. 
The Historical Evolution of the Company Studied 
The company chosen as the site for the case study to be reported in this article, and 
which we will call Solane (not its real name), was founded in 1969 by two partners, as 
achain of discount outlets, distributing pharmaceutical and relatedproducts. It was not 
originally a franchise operation, and there were already five company-owned stores 
before a first franchise was added in 1973 . As the network grew, however, the number 
of franchises quickly overtook the company-owned operations, although the latter 
were to reach thirty in all before declining to become relatively unimportant in the total 
pict~re.~ In 1980, one of the partners sold out to the other. A period of rapid growth 
followed, and the network was to more than double in size over the next decade, 
reaching 100 franchises in all by 1986, and about 150 at the time of writing (during an 
eight-month research period alone the number of outlets increased by more than 
twenty). In 1986, the company went public, with the goal of raising capital to permit 
an extension of its operations into the United States. In 1987, a decision was made to 
computerize the general merchandising operations of the network, and the task of 
developing a system design for both head office operations and the franchises was 
turnedover to a fully owned subsidiary calledParcom (also a fictional name). This was 
the point of departure for the present research, in that the task of evaluating the 
opportunity costs of computerization was assumed by the research team from the 
Groupe d71ntervention en Recherche Organisationnelle (GISCOR) from the Universit6 
de MontrM in partnership with the Canadian Workplace Automation Research Center 
(CWARC) in Laval, Quebec, a wing of the federal Department of Communications. 
Obviously, over fifteen years, an organization's culture changes. What those who 
were present in the network at the beginning remember-franchiser, franchisees and 
,employees alike-was an era when everything had to be built from the ground up. It 
was a time, at least in some people's memory, when suggestions were welcomed (if not 
indeed actively solicited), because the network, in its own field a pioneer, was 
innovating almost daily. From 1973 to 1976, or thereabouts, several of the local 
franchise-holders regularly contributed their time to work at the head office on a 
volunteer basis, to serve on committees, or act as the people responsible for a given 
sector of activity. This loan of time could add up to ten hours a week in some cases. 
Head office staff was small, and tended to be nonspecialized: head office employees 
had none of the aura, or the inaccessability, of the expert and tended to be thought of 
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as people to whom one delegated responsibility for tasks which principals did not have 
time to anend to themselves. Franchise-holders felt an emotional link to the new 
enterprise that transcended purely operational considerations-a link made all the 
stronger by the fact that both franchiser and franchise-holders were members on equal 
standing of the same professional association. For those members of the network, the 
right to speak directly to the President, without passing through any intervening levels, 
seemed fundamental. The franchiser was merely primus inter pares-although 
quickly becoming a kind of folk hero to his network associates. 
By 1976, as the network grew, things began gradually to change. Direct 
participation by the franchisees in head office operations was becoming a thing of the 
past, while head office staff started to take on a more explicitly specialized look. By 
1980, the process was well advanced: head office had become a reality with its own 
personality, increasingly interposing itself as the communication relay between local 
entrepreneurs, and the chief executive. The reaction of franchisees was mixed: 
conditioned on the one hand by awareness of the need for an efficient, professional 
operation and yet balanced on the other by a dawning recognition of their increasing 
alienation from the true centers of power and decision making. Significantly, by 1979, 
the franchisees had moved to create an association called Toxedec (another pseudo- 
nym) to represent their collective interests, independently of the latter's definition by 
the chief executive. The formation of this group was also a reflection of turbulence at 
the top (the original partnership dissolved in 1980, it will be recalled) and considerable 
doubt about the future of the network. One press report, for example, had the owner 
prepared to buy out existing franchises. People who had only just begun to emerge 
from debt and to make a solid profit experienced considerable anxiety as they 
envisaged the future of the enterprise (and their place in it). The creation of Toxedec 
was itself to become a source of tension, leading the franchiser to attempt (without 
notable success) to set up a "consultative committee", independent of Toxedec, to air 
grievances which he privately thought exaggerated, if not outright "childish". His was 
necessarily the larger vision: building the basis for a commercial empire which he was 
not alone in seeing as of benefit to all members of the network. Even the people most 
suspicious of his motives recognized the need for his leadership. If the potential 
polarization never flamed into open conflict, it was, however, also in part because the 
power of Toxedec to focus the concerns of the local owners was constantly being 
diluted, during a period of spectacular growth (doubling in the space of five years), by 
the addition of new franchise-holders, ignorant of the network's history and as yet 
unsympathetic to the objectives of Toxedec. 
Among the new members of the network were many previously autonomous 
owners who had little option to join or not to join, in that they could no longer compete 
with the larger network (and the economies of scale it offered) as independents. Since 
they could notbeat Solane, their only real choice was to become part of i t  A new source 
of tension thus became visible, this time dividing the franchisees as well: on the one 
hand, established owners were beginning to reap the benefits of the aggressive policies 
of the franchiser, which had established itself as the market leader for its region; on the 
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other, internal competition was becoming a reality, as store operators discovered that 
their profit margins were being cut into by the competition from down the street, in the 
form of another franchise-holder in their own network! Territorial rights to exclusive 
distribution, a trivial issue in the beginning, were beginning to loom large in the minds 
of both the franchiser (who now somewhat regretted his previous generosity) and 
franchisees (who were finding it difficult to guarantee what they took to be legitimate 
rights to an established turf). In the minds of the latter, the ratio of relative gains 
separating franchiser and franchisee as aresult of expansion was widening: the network 
was visibly flourishing while their own margins of profit grew more slowly. Their 
diminishing influence was further emphasized by the increasingly visible intrusion of 
the head office bureaucrats into their own operations, of which the initial computer- 
ization of client files for prescription drugs in 1980 was but one example. More 
importantly, decisions as to employee salary scales were being taken by the Human 
Resources division at head office, leading local franchise-holders to complain about 
the latter's excessive open-handedness towards the people who worked in the local 
stores: "The money doesn't come out of their pockets", we were told, "It costs them 
nothing to give salary raises to the employees of the franchisees". 
The problem with a "value-adding partnership", such as the franchise network we 
have been describing, seems to be that the "added value" is not necessarily distributed 
to the equal satisfaction of all the partners. 
The Operation of a Franchised Network in Practice 
Solane offers a potential franchise-holder a contract, for a limited time period, 
automatically renewable in the absence of an explicit termination request by the 
franchisee. Originally, franchise-holders had firstright of refusal when anew franchise 
was to be set up within their given territory. The practice of protected temtories is, 
however, now becoming less common. Fees are owed to the franchiser for a variety 
of services (some optional, some obligatory), including administrative, financial, 
professional and technical, from which the franchisee is assumed to benefit. Fees are 
collected on a monthly basis, based on a percentage of gross sales. The books of the 
franchise-holder must be kept completely open to inspection by the franchiser and the 
"image" of the network must be respected at all times in any store's advertising and 
merchandising. The franchisee must buy all the products offered by the franchiser, 
which are billed on a cost-plus-overhead basis. Franchisees are obliged to display in 
their stores all products carrying the house label plus those for which Solane holds 
exclusive rights. Individual store owners may not set the sale price higher than that 
established for a product by the franchiser. In principle, franchisees have to deal 
exclusively with the franchiser in stocking their shelves. In practice, the situation is 
somewhat more complicated, in part for historical reasons. Operators are allowed, as 
a tolerated practice (in part because infringements are hard to police) to deal directly 
with outside wholesalers when the latter's products are not otherwise available in the 
company's warehouse. 
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The conditions of the partnership are spelled out explicitly in a number of company 
policies, which include the following. 
The rental agreement: in general, the •’ranchiser is either the owner of the outlet 
(which is then rented to the franchisee), or holds a mortgage on it. 
Obligation to buy: by the terms of the contract, all franchise-holders must buy 
supplies from the warehouse of the franchiser for all products in the latter's catalogue, 
the percentage of such purchases not ever to fall below 80% of all sales. 
Formal ordering: whenever there is a house product available, or there exists 
an exclusive arrangement with a designated supplier, the franchisee is obliged toplace 
all orders for products through the franchiser's warehouse. 
Direct ordering; some products with high turn-over are ordered directly from the 
authorized supplier by the franchisee, without passing through head office, although 
it is Solane which receives the bills and forwards them to the franchisee (after adding 
on a percentage as overhead). 
Automatic forwarding: some lines of goods, chosen by the franchiser, are 
automatically supplied to each outlet on a periodic replacement basis (no order being 
required), the quantity supplied being invariable across all franchise-holders, indepen- 
dent of sue or location. 
Pre-authorized payment (transfer of funds): the franchiser has the right to 
transfer payment of dues directly from the bank account of the individual store. 
Directpurchasing: where a product is not available from the franchiser himself, 
the individual store is allowed (tolerated is perhaps the better term) to deal directly with 
outside suppliers, in which case it is the local store which is billed, and not head office. 
Loss leaders: each week, a certain number of products are selected as promotions 
at a price which the franchiser sets (and which may be less than the actual cost to the 
franchisee). 
Company specials: a certain number of products, which experience has shown 
to be important customer drawing cards, are offered regularly to clients, "friends", at 
advantageous prices compared to the competition, on the theory that while the margin 
of profit on these items is small, the volume of expected sales should more than 
compensate the local store operator for the reduction in price. 
The golden age club: customers 65 years old and over areentitled to acard which 
gives them discounts on certain products, although valid only on specified days of the 
month. 
Local advertising: franchisees may advertise in local newspapers. 
National advertising: national advertising is the responsibility of the franchiser, 
the costs being distributed to the franchises on a pro rata basis. 
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Distribution of circulars: publicity in the form of circulars, designed to attract 
the interest of customers, is supplied to store operators on a cost-per basis, the latter 
being responsible for their distribution to clients, in the store or door-to-door, in their 
district. 
Direct supervision: in order to ensure conformity with the image and the policies 
of the network, management-selected supervisors (who may be ex-managers of stores) 
make regular inspection trips to the franchise, where they may also provide expert 
advice to the local operator on improvements to business practice. 
Theproductivity index: each employee's individual performance is evaluated on 
the basis of the time taken to effect a given task. 
The customer advisory council: regular after-hour get-togethers, to be organized 
by the franchise-holder in conjunction with selected customers and store employees 
in order to discuss store policy, all on a voluntary basis, are encouraged. 
The Existing Communication System 
At the point of initiation of the present research project, there had already been in 
operation, since 1980, a system for the cross-network recording of information on a 
particular class of client, those ordering prescription drugs. All files on customers are 
stored centrally. Like many such systems, which link a mainframe to a widely 
distributed (and growing) network of dumb terminals located in the individual stores, 
severe problems of overloading havebegun to become evident, and breakdowns are not 
infrequent (tending, moreover, to coincide with rush-hour business when the store is 
full of customers and system reliability becomes particularly important). 
In conjunction with the computer system, the company had also installed an 
elementary facility permitting electronic mail. Transmission is, however, unidirec- 
tional, from head office to the franchises. Furthermore, messages, once transmitted, 
are immediately erased, and cannot be stored to be read later. Reception of messages 
thus depends on employee attentiveness. Since messages are received at the terminal, 
but are often directed to the store owner or manager who is elsewhere, the transmitted 
information runs a considerable risk of being either lost or garbled before it reaches its 
ultimate destination. Follow-up phone calls are almost obligatory. 
The store operator is also the target of a stream of memos, color-coded to indicate 
the category of product in question, which serve to communicate vital operational data, 
including changes of policy, product availability, price, shipment schedules, and so on. 
All kinds of communication problems emerge from this kind of system. For one thing, 
policies on promotional campaigns, including which products will be marketed as 
specials and at what price, are decided well in advance, and distributed to the 
franchisees; unfortunately, such things as warehouse delivery snafus, unexpected 
price changes and revised decisions as to the preferred specials, intervene, with the 
result that the store operator may receive up to ten or more contradictory communica- 
tions concerning the same product. The result is confusion, and a multiplication of 
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frantic telephone calls directed to head office (where theemployees are also themselves 
subject to problems of crossed signals) designed to correct the situation. 
Telephone communication is vulnerable to its own kind of parasitic noise. All too 
often, the individual at head office whom store operators have come to consider the 
person to whom to turn for information is in a meeting (if not transferred to another 
department). Given the resulting frustration, it is not surprising to discover a 
phenomenon of dysfunction (Merton, 1940; Merton, 1949), in that astute franchisees 
have learned to cultivate a network of chums in head office, in an effort to circumvent 
informational barriers by developing alternate sources. This is a luxury not available 
to all (especially to those physically located far from the center, for whom telephone 
costs tend to be prohibitive, and who can less easily recruit friends at court). And it is 
particularly frustrating for those older, established franchise-holders, who fmd it hard 
to reconcile themselves to the idea that they can no longer do their business directly 
with the President. Small wonder then that people in the franchises speak sarcastically 
of the Head Office "secretary barrier". 
Perhaps the weakest link in the communication system, however, is that which is 
supposed to support ordering practices. Franchisees send orders to the franchiser using 
an instrument called Telxon. The order data are entered, hopefully without error, and 
stored to be transmitted overnight over an ordinary telephone line. Unfortunately, 
system reliability is not high and there is no way to detect failure. In addition, there is 
no certainty the order willbe fdledcompletely, even if it reaches the warehouse without 
incident. Warehouse shortages are not uncommon (15 to 20% is common, according 
to one informant). Since the store operator is required to use the company warehouse, 
the deficiencies in the system are particularly irritating. By the time the shortfall is 
discovered, there is no time to develop alternative sources. Not only is the profit picture 
directly affected, there is a risk of alienating regular customers. 
Many stores in the network (about 50%, if our sample is accurate) have some 
experience in the computerization of office operations. In principle, the company 
systems development subsidiary, Parcom, was mandated some years ago to come up 
with an accounting system in response to franchisee expressed needs. In practice, their 
solution was slow to be developed, and not particularly well adapted to actual office 
requirements, for an interesting reason. In theory, customer transactions in this kind 
of franchise are either cash or credit card based. In fact, many stores run a line of credit 
for a certain number of regular customers, including schools, summer camps, etc. 
Furthermore, although the practice is discouraged, many franchise-holders have 
invested in other businesses, and may be running a second company from their office. 
For these reasons, store operators need an accounts receivable function in their 
software, which wasnot available on the company system. Theresult is aproliferation 
of computer systems bought externally. 
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A Brief Description of the Research ProjectS 
At the inception of the study reported on here, Solane had already decided to embark 
on a staged programme of computerization involving, first, two head office services 
(purchasing and the warehouse) and, second, a franchise function (cash registers). A 
time horizon for completion of the project was set at two years. Parcom was assigned 
the task of developing a project for ultimate approval by the executive council, to 
include an action plan which would define a calendar of implementation phases and 
determine costs. The project was also expected to develop and/or procure software to 
support general office operations in the franchises, to be made available to the latter on 
avoluntary basis, although the exact natureof the system to be developed was left open, 
in the absence of detailed knowledge of actual requirements. Fixed deadlines for the 
head office project were established. The role of the outside research team from the 
Universitk de MontrM was not specified in detail, other than to support Parcom in 
assessing the existing situation in the franchises. 
Shortly afterwards, the fust of what was to become a series of "changes of plan" 
(and adjustments to the calendar) occurred: the vice-president responsible for 
warehouse operations resigned and his functions were temporady taken over by 
another vice-president, who was also responsible for purchasing. As a result, the 
warehouse computerization project was shelved for the immediate future, and the 
franchise project was moved forward on the agenb6 
In retrospect, the research project can be visualized as broken down by phase. The 
first phase aimed to familiarize the researchers in depth with the computerization 
project. Research took the form of unstructured interviews with planners and on-site 
observation of operations in the purchasing department Phase 11 had as its objective 
to develop a qualitative understanding of the actual operations of a franchise, at the 
local store level. One of the researchers, accompanied by a member of the Parcom 
team, visited six outlets in order to determine the nature of operational practice in the 
stores, particularly with respect to ofice functions. These preliminary interviews were 
again unstructured, and were restricted to franchise-holders. The purpose of Phase 111 
was to document a number of perceptions arising from the previous interview phases 
and to determine attitudes to computerization through a survey based on a limited 
questionnaire, the results of which were expected to support recommendations to the 
client organization, Solane. The survey was purposive rather than random, in that it 
was designed to include franchises varying in size (from 4000 to 12000 square feet in 
floor space), length of time in the network (average, 6 years; 5 of those interviewed had 
previously been members of another franchising operation), distance from the center, 
number of stores operated by a given franchise-holder (average, 2) and previous 
computer experience (slightly more than half, 57%). Respondents were interviewed 
at length in the field by a team of researchers using semi-structured questionnaires. In 
addition, respondents were encouraged to supplement answers by free-form responses 
to open questions. In all, 37 franchisees (operators of 74 franchises, i.e., roughly half 
of the total in the network at that time), 23 managers and 4 controllers completed the 
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questionnaire and/or were interviewed in some depth. Phase IV was given over to 
analysis of the findings, to produce three distinct reports: 1) an assessment of the 
opportunity costs of computerization, with recommendations, delivered to Parcom; 2) 
an evaluation of the political situation, for the attention of the President of Solane; and 
3) a scientific report submitted to the Canadian Workplace Automation Research 
Center which was in turn supplemented by a Master's thesis (the basis of the present 
article). 
The Findings 
The Computerization of Head Ofice: Purchasing 
Head office turned out to have been surprisingly little touched by the "computer 
revolution": there was, for example, no word processing facility at all available there. 
The almost complete absence of an overall computerization policy meant that while the 
head office accounting system was computerized, it was not linked to the purchasing 
service (much less to the franchised local outlets). The purchasing department's 
system was so out of date as to qualify as "old-fashioned", and had become quite 
inadequate to the increasing demand resulting from a growing operation. 
At the outset of the present study, the implementation of a new system for 
purchasing was already in progress. Since purchasing is a nerve center for the entire 
network, the initial interviews and observations focused on the post-implementation 
dynamic as a means of beginning to comprehend the logic of the overall system. At 
the time, the staff of the purchasing department was composed of twelve persons, of 
whom six were buyers, and six assistants. Each buyer is responsible for a product line 
and it is his job to negotiate terms with suppliers. Since the suppliers are limited in 
number and are always more or less the same, there is a tendency over the years for the 
buyers to develop intimate social relationships with individuals they are in contact with 
on an almost daily basis and with whom they need to develop trust relationships for the 
efficient conduct of business, since there is an irreducible element of verbal agreement 
in this kind of contract making. Buying is acomplex task, involving multiple variables, 
requiring navigation between the reefs of understocking (with the attendant risk of 
shortages) and overstocking (leading to excessive warehouse costs), the estimation of 
changing customer tastes, and the ability to negotiate volume discounts, or talk 
suppliers into company-specific bonuses. The assistant's task is to keep track of 
agreements, and to follow up on them, by verifying, for example, that the products 
ordered are actually received and by correcting errors where they occur. Disputes with 
suppliers over agreed-upon discounts are not uncommon, as the arrangements leave the 
hands of the negotiators, where there are implicit understandings, to be processed by 
the respective paper bureaucracies. The situation is complicated by the fact that the 
accounting department is in no position to verify the claims for discounts from a given 
supplier submitted by the purchaser. The company comptroller also gets into the act. 
The principal objective of the purchasing department computerization project was 
not to link this service to the franchises, butrather to connect it to thesuppliers' systems, 
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the latter being for the most part considerably further along on the path to computer- 
ization than Solane itself. The internal motivation seems to have been double: on the 
one hand to develop better follow-up on the agreements with suppliers, by making 
available information on what products had been ordered, in what quantities, at what 
price, and with what volume discounts. There seems as well to have been a second 
agenda, having as its goal to reduce the time buyers spend in the company of supplier 
representatives and the danger of a growing incestuous relationship, with its danger of 
special arrangements, not sanctioned by the company. 
A description in detail on the effect of the introduction of the new system goes 
beyond this report. It will suffice to say that the new system was generally accepted 
by employees as an improvement over the old, with reservations: the software proved 
to be awkward (a cumbersome layered menu system), not fully representative of their 
operations (significant omissions), introduced with insufficient follow-up for learning, 
with the old terminalsreserved for the most frequent users (the assistants, all females), 
a diminution of autonomy ("Everyone uses my machine, now") and a distinct loss of 
privacy (including the threat of computer monitoring of performance). 
Ironically, for a system that was supposed to economize the buyers' time, one 
effect has been to build pressure for the creation of new assistant positions, given the 
more voluminous information now produced by the new computer applications. 
For our present purposes, it is sufficient to note that: 1) the linking of the 
purchasing department to the franchises was adjourned to an indefinite future and; 2) 
since the warehouse is not computerized, there is no way to determine, by computer 
access, when stock is running low and should be re-ordered. "Just-in-time" manage- 
ment is not yet part of this organization's culture. 
The Computerization of the Franchises: The Cash Register Project 
The intention guiding the proposed franchise project was to install a microcom- 
puter in each store, linked to the cash register. In this manner, it would be possible to 
track immediately the volume of sales, by product line, across the entire network, on 
a day-by-day, or even hour-by-hour, basis, if necessary. The motivation for this 
innovation was to speed up the collection of dues from franchisees which, it will be 
recalled, are based on a proportion of gross sales, and are at present paid by the month. 
The current practice is to estimate dues for a given month on the basis of the previous 
month's sales, a subsequent adjustment being made when more complete information 
on the most recent performance is available, usually about two weeks later. The 
implementation of an on-line computer system wouldeliminate astep in the calculation 
of gross sales, one which now involves the local store. The effect would be to reverse 
the process, in that head office would now supply the local operator with statistics on 
his or her volume of business, rather than the opposite. 
Parcom was also prepared to offer to franchisees a line of software packages for 
their individual office use, although the exact nature of the offering remained to be 
determined. 
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The proposed project was veiled in secrecy at the time of arrival of the research 
team (since it was clearly a head office initiative, and the eventual franchisee reaction 
was judged to be problematical). The round of interviews with six franchise-holders 
conducted by a member of theresearch team (accompanied by an employee of Parcom) 
thus constituted the first communication of the project to the franchise-holders 
themselves. All franchisees visited, chosen by Parcom, already had acomputer facility 
installed in their store? For Parcom, these interviews came to be seen as the basis for 
a proposal which they expected to make to a semi-annual meeting of franchisees, 
scheduled for six months later. The research project then became defined as the 
instrument by which to verify the receptivity of franchisees to their overall proposal, 
and to survey the latters' expectations for office software. Their immediate interest 
remained, however, basically technical: to determine the make of each cash register, 
whether it couldbe connected up to the network without serious modification, whether 
it already containedacomputer facility permitting what iscal1edautomatic"price look- 
up" (PLU), what percentage of sales was based on credit cards (looking forward to the 
introduction of debit cards, permitting instantaneous fund transfer), etc. Where 
extensive replacement was involved, as aresult of older model machines, the fear was 
that the cost to the local operator would generate opposition and slow introduction of 
the system. 
The Results of the Survey8 
The purpose of the survey undertaken in the summer of 1988 was in part to confm a 
number of conclusions to which the previous unstructured interviews had led us, and 
in part to provide quantitative support for the report to be submitted to Parcom, on 
attitudes to computerization. The questionnaire was accordingly organized around a 
set of themes, including perceptions as to the functioning of the organization's current 
communication system, expectations with respect to the role of computers in admin- 
istration, and more general attitudes towards the company's general policies, the 
participation (or lack thereof) of franchise-holders in key areas of decision making and 
the trend towards a more centralized operation (with its associated implication of more 
active control of local operations by head office). Results, it will be recalled, were 
based on a sample of €2 respondents (37 franchise-holders,operators of 74 outlets, and 
27 managers or controllers). 
Overall, as expected, attitudes towards computerization were without exception 
highly favorable (averaging about 5 on a 6-point scale). Interestingly enough, there 
was a tendency for attitudes to be even more positive in operations without experience 
in computerization than in those with (although the effect is slight, given the overall 
response skew). Unsurprisingly, the more a respondent believed him- or herself to be 
competent in operating a computer, the more positive the attitude (roughly two out of 
five had some training in computer operation, though the source of learning was 
extremely diverse). Curiously, franchise-holders without computers thought of 
themselves as more competent than those with, while the situation is reversed for 
managers and controllers, who clearly are the ones in computerized operations to 
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become familiar with the operation of the system. A striking finding of this phase of 
the survey was that the longer a franchise-holder had been in the network, the less 
enthusiastic he or she was towards computerization (r=-.432, pc0.01). This effect was 
not due to age, which is uncorrelated with attitude to computerization. 
Our previous interviews had led us to identify shortcomings in the communication 
system of the enterprise. The survey phase reinforced this perception. Just under 50% 
of respondents (49. I%), when asked for their computerization priorities? cited either 
inventory control (28.2%) or ordering (20.9%). Both of these functions, we already 
knew, constitute major headaches for store operators. Neither figured high in the head 
office strategy to be developed by Parcom. On the other hand, Parcom's main priority, 
the computerization of cash registers (mentioned by only 6.7% of respondents at least 
once) was not listed as a major preoccupation of owners and managers. (It has to be 
noted, however, that "computerization of cash registers" meant something different to 
respondents than to Parcom, in that they perceived it as restricted to the in-store 
operation, and not as part of a network rationalization. Opinions with respect to the 
head office project were considerably more distributed among franchisees, varying 
from a "conditional" yes, 20%, to a partial agreement, 23%, to mild disagreement, 
22%, to unconditional disagreement, 24%, with 11% undecided.) On the other hand, 
another Parcom priority, reports on sales by department, proved to be a franchisee 
preoccupation (mentioned by 9.1% of respondents) and was judged to be one of the 
most useful functions of a computerized operation equally by both managers and 
owners. Again, however, reports-on-sales was thought of as an in-store function. 
Of respondents, 10.9% listed accounting software as a priority, but this figure 
reflected divergences in existing practice (14% for noncomputerized respondents, 6% 
for computerized). Functions such as employee schedules (8%) and personnel 
management (4%) attracted less attention. The overloaded memo system now in use 
was universally deplored. Projects such as electronic mail, a Parcom priority, elicited 
little enthusiasm. Parcom's role was itself a source of spontaneous reaction on the part 
of some respondents: their service was judged not good enough, too oriented to head 
office and too high-priced. 
Among the questions we posed to franchisees were two designed to elicit opinions 
as to the relative advantage accruing, respectively, to the franchiser and the franchisees 
from the various company policies described above. The results tell us a good deal 
about the strains and stresses typical of a polycentric franchising operation. Asked, for 
example, to rank in turn, in separate questions, the profitability of each of the policies, 
the answers fell into groups:1•‹ 
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Table 1 
Comparative advantage of company policies to franchiser and franchisee, as 
perceived by a sample offranchisee respondents l1 (allfigures are presented in 
terms of the mean response) 
Perceived Perceived 
franchiser franchisee Difference 
advantage advantage 
1. The hegemony of the franchiser: 
The obligation to buy 5.76 3.53 3.23 
Pre-authorized payment 5.64 2.86 2.78 
The rental agreement 5.55 3.53 2.02 




Golden age club 




4. Nuisance interventions: 
The performance index 4.47 4.09 .38 
The customer advisory council 4.23 3.57 .66 
5. Thefranchisee's room to manoeuvre: 
Direct purchasing 2.26 5.00 -2.74 
This pattern of responses, reflecting the attitudes of half of the franchise-holders 
in the network, reads like a profile of network tensions. Franchisees' considerable 
sense of insecurity as "partners" in an enterprise where the senior member holds the 
best cards is reflected in the first group of policies, which all relate to the contractual 
conditions of adherence to the network, and which are perceived to be strongly slanted 
to the advantage of the franchiser. The second group is related to the primary benefit 
of a franchising system, as they perceive it, compared to the position of the indepen- 
dent: the ability to attract a clientele. Here the advantage is seen to be more eqiitably 
shared, except for loss leaders and specials both of which tend to workmore to the 
franchiser's benefit more than the store operator, in the latter's view?2 The third group 
of policies fall under the heading of "accepted business practice" and seem to be more 
or less accepted as the price of doing business in a network13 The policies related to 
customer advisory councils and the measurement of employee performance seem to be 
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classed under the heading of "silly interference by head office into the day-to-day 
operations of the franchises": if they do not generate more resentment, it is because 
they are largely ineffective, if not just ignored. The one non-official, "tolerated", 
policy where franchise-holders perceive themselves to have a real advantage is the 
freedom to occasionally do their own purchasing from suppliers, independent of the 
network. Nothing could better illustrate the mixture of motives characteristic of our 
respondents' attitudes towards their own network: considerable pride and loyalty, 
confirmed strongly in both our formal and informal interviews, in belonging to an 
enterprise which is among the most dynamic, and successful, of any in Canada today 
(certainly in its own field, merchandising), a recognition of the vulnerable position of 
the independent small retailer in today's economy, but also a healthy measure of 
skepticism concerning the motives and competence of the franchiser and his manage- 
ment team. One franchise-holder whom we interviewed observed that he had bought 
what was previously a money-losing corporate-owned store and had turned it into a 
profitable business by not respecting, to the letter of the law, company regulations. 
According to him, the reason the outlet was not profitable before was precisely 
because, being a company store, it had to obey the rules. 
The ambivalence of franchise-holders is reflected in their other responses to 
questions related to their power to influence company policy. No single question 
elicited a stronger reaction than those having to do with the capacity to influence head 
office (p=2.82), or the likelihood of being consulted in the taking of a decision 
(p=2.63).14 To the extent that any influence existed at all, it was seen as channeled 
through the franchisee association, Toxedec, but even here the response was minimally 
positive (p=3.73). To the question asking whether head office encouraged sugges- 
tions, managers replied in a slightly more positive way than franchise-holders, in that 
the former are surveyed from time to time on their opinions, while the latter are called 
together twice a year for meetings where, in their view, "...they [i.e., the head office 
people] know everything, weknow nothing." Yet, at the same time, franchise-holders 
doubted that they could achieve the same results without belonging to the network 
(p=2.38) and expressed themselves as strongly supporting the values of the network 
(5 .13) .  Similarly, franchise-holders replied negatively when questioned as to 
whether they would favor a greater degree of centralization @=2.89), yet even on this 
issue, opinion was not unanimous. Some were prepared to cede some of their room to 
manoeuvre (in the form of direct purchasing) if the result were to be a more centralized 
system, with a more uniform offering of products. Those who favored a degree of 
centralization were also those most enthusiastic towards greater computerization, 
while those most opposed tended to be the same people who had been longest in the 
network. Not surprisingly, therefore, as we saw above, the longer the franchisee had 
been in the network, the less his or her enthusiasm for computerization (I=-.432, 
p=0.008). Well-established businesses have stabilized work practices and more 
confident management, have become profitable and are headed up by people who have 
witnessed the evolution of the franchising operation, with its mixture of benefits and 
disadvantages, and have become jealous of their independence; newer members of the 
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network apparently lack the same assurance and are considerably more dependent on 
the services offered by head office for their continued viability. Of course, those who 
have been longest in the network are also the most likely to be associated with the 
franchisees' association, Toxedec, and to have the most political clout. Their potential 
opposition to a computerization project is therefore not atrivial consideration, from the 
point of view of head office. 
The "Waiting for Godot" effectls 
The most single striking finding of our entire study was not one built into the initial 
study design at all: the proposed computerization programme never even came close 
to getting off the ground! Throughout the entire research period, deadlines kept being 
pushed back, and at the time of writing of this article, a further extension has just been 
announced. We are still waiting. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The kind of research we have been describingrepresents a turning away from the search 
for nomothetic laws typical of an earlier-and more positivist--era. Its intention is 
unabashedly idiographic: it aims to understand the communicational dynamics of a 
single observed organization by a patient sifting through the testimonies of the people 
who are associated with it. This is not, however, to abjure the goal of reaching a level 
of generality greater than the single case, and to say something of use, for example, 
about the overall phenomenon of computerization, as it relates to organizational 
dynamics. The ability to generalize, however, as we see it, is not to be guaranteed only 
through resorting to the standard procedures of statistical sampling andanalysis (which 
have their place), but is rather to be accomplished by the accumulation and study of a 
variety of individually distinct observations and cases, from which, in conjunction with 
a developing theory of communication, some general principles can be modestly 
derived. 
We couldbegin by noting, for example, that the concept of "need", as it has been 
used in the literature on computerization, is a very shaky one. When we try to apply 
the idea of "need" to the case study we have been presenting, it is evident that the 
perception of need, like that of beauty, is inevitably filtered through the eyes of a 
beholder: the need of head office accountants to get a better grip on the dues collection 
process, or the need of local franchise operations to control the re-stocking process, are 
each in their own terms justified by a set of legitimate preoccupations, but they do not 
together add up to a coherent policy of computerization, applicable across the whole 
enterprise. Indeed, strictly speaking, it is unclear that the two sets of objectives are even 
compatible, in that each can be seen as an unwarranted intrusion into the established 
turf of partners in an organization whose intrinsic raison d'etre is a cooperative asso- 
ciation of interests whose motives are not perfectly coincident. In the kind of 
polycentric network we have been describing, neither franchiser nor franchisee is 
exempt from dependence on the other. This is not a McDonalds hamburger chain; the 
franchisees are professionals, holding a monopoly position protected by law, whose 
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massive loss of adherence (by going over to a rival franchiser, for instance), however 
unlikely, would be catastrophic for the franchiser. At the same time, the members of 
the network are quite aware that they need their sponsor even to survive. The 
measurement of "need", in this circumstance, appears to us highly problematical. 
Even the term "computerization" now appears less clearly etched. A definite 
finding of our observations was that knowledge of, and experience with, computers 
was unequally distributed and overall tended to be sketchy, at best. Computerization, 
in these terms, is an event which has multiple meanings, depending on who your 
correspondent is. Ludwig Wittgenstein shocked the philosophical community by 
pointing out that a well-known word such as "game" has no single definitional trait 
applicable to every case; a game is not captured by a single concept, but rather by a 
family of concepts. The word "computerization", of much more recent coinage, is 
likely to be even less stable in its meanings. While the people we interviewed in Solane 
were all discussing "computerization", they were frequently talking about different 
things. 
Behind these observations lies another of considerably greater importance: even 
the company itself is not a single well-defined entity. The word "company" also covers 
a family of concepts, and the experience of it is filtered through the phenomenologi- 
cally restricted experience of its diverse membership. Here the meaning of Weick's 
term "loose coupling" begins to become clear (Weick, 1976; Weick, 1985). An 
organization is really many organizations; it is a single reality only at the symbolic 
level, as part of some membership community's discourse. At the level of operations, 
the connections may be more tenuous. As our interviews proceeded in the context of 
the present study, we were forcibly struck by the low channel capacity of many of 
Solane's most important links. The purchasing department and the warehouse carry 
out complementary functions, but their relationship is weakly coordinated. The 
systems group had, to us,astonishingly littleknowledge, prior to the intervention of the 
outside research group, of the user community for whom they were, in principle, 
designing a new communicational infrastructure. The procurement service was in 
some ways more intimately linked to its outsidecorrespondents than to its complemen- 
tary functions within the organization. Communication between the franchised 
operations and central services was a daily adventure in ambiguity resolution. The 
relations of the systems development group to the executive committee on which they 
directly depended were sporadic, and enveloped in boardroom politics. 
There lies in this attenuated communication pattern, we would suggest, the 
elements of an explanation for one of the persistent findings in the literature on 
computerization: its surprisingly superficial--and contingent-impact on organiza- 
tional performance (Child, Gunter & Kieser, 1987; Dunais, Kraut & Koch, 1988; 
Kraemer & King, 1986; Robey, 1981).16 Even when computerized systems have been 
installed at a nontrivial cost to the organization, the result is all too frequently, even 
when they are enthusiastically adopted by the users, rather little impact on established 
ways of going about work, and little noticeable benefit in improved productivity (as 
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Clark, Dechman and Snider point out in their contribution to this issue). If our case 
study is in any way typical of the general situation (and our own professional 
experience suggests it is), the reason for the sub-performance of the technology is close 
to hand: the weak communication link-and low channel capacity-of the systems 
design and implementation community with other components in the organization. 
There were many reasons for this in the case we studied: as a group, it is not in a strong 
political position in the organization and as a result tends to move with caution and a 
certain secretiveness; the culture of the organization tends towards the autocratic in 
style, and hardly encourages open consultation of the kind that would lead to in-depth 
understanding of the user community; the group works in a specialized area outside the 
main preoccupation of the company, which is network expansion, not consolidation; 
and in any case, loose coupling is just a historical fact of life in this fm. (There may 
also be a weakly developed tradition among design engineers in this field of studying 
the logic of user practices, or to following up with evaluation.) As a result, the design 
process is based on incomplete knowledge of the workday reality of the people who are 
eventually going to be using the new systems." 
There are two effects which follow from this weak communication. The first is 
illustrated by the implementation programme carried on in the purchasing department 
of the organization we studied, where the installed software was neither particularly 
"user friendly" nor did it fit very well with actual purchasing practice. When such a 
misfit occurs, one common way of dealing with it (and here our results converge with 
those of Marsden, also reported in this issue) is for the users, most frequently low-status 
women, to carry the extra freight, by not only absorbing the blame for the lack of 
productivity, but also by compensating for the shortcomings of the technology by 
conscientiously taking on an extra load of work. This of course does not solve the 
problem, but it does hide it. The truth is that the technology is frequently not nearly 
as good as it is made out to be. 
The second effect is illustrated by the curious noncommunication we have 
reported on between head office, including its system development group, and the 
franchisees, with respect to computerization. Part of the reason the project did not 
advance much during the study period probably had to do with head office politics, but 
part also can be explained by the considerable difficulty of planning and developing 
a very complex new technology for a community of users one does not know very well 
nor command an understanding of their work. In other words, a second effect of weak 
communication is to retard the implementation process. 
At this level of observation, we confiront a different phenomenon: the absence in 
much of the literature on computerization of what might be called the organizational 
perspective. The literature has exemplified in general two main approaches. The first 
is instrumental and utilitarian, constrained to the description of a carefully delimited 
sphere of operations, a selected object of analysis such as an office, which is to be 
computerized. The second is broadly social-psychological, concentrated on the reac- 
tions, attitudes and "needs" of a given user community. In both these approaches, the 
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organizational environment is given parameters, to permit the designer or researcher 
to concentrate on the immediate object Unfortunately, what these two perspectives 
collectively accomplish is to mask the presence of the system designers within the 
organization, and by rendering them invisible, to hide the politics that inevitably 
characterize any polycentric, loosely coupled organization. By "politics" we do not 
necessarily mean to refer to "games people play" (although obviously large organiza- 
tions are not immune to that kind either), but rather to the fact that, where the 
communication is relatively attenuated, and the center is relatively influential, it may 
become very difficult to radically alter an existing equilibrium by the introduction of 
a radical innovation. 
It is clear that present-day managers are encountering problems in integrating the 
new technologies. Such difficulties are probably not insuperable in the long run, but 
for many companies there is no long run. They are being forced to change, rather 
rapidly, for exactly the same reasons they first came into existence, in embryonic form, 
in the nineteenth century: as a response to the changing reality of a vastly extended 
communication system, making geographically extended company operations not just 
profitable, but in theendinevitable. We have now entered an eraof global competition, 
once again, as a century ago, threatening to render obsolete the modal forms of 
organization of our society. Now, as then, established organizations find it hard to 
adapt. Perhaps the one time when building a new communication infrastructure may 
not be difficult is at the moment of founding of a new enterprise. Later, the forces 
maintaining the existing equilibrium become very powerful. Taking these factors 
together, it would be reasonable to predict a very rapid turnover in the founding of new 
organizations, accompanied by an equally high rate of established fm mortality. 
There is some evidence, in recent statistics, that this is now occurring (Taylor, 
forthcoming). Future studies of computerization would benefit by taking a more 
historical perspective, better grounded in a communicational theory of the fm. 
Conclusion: The Need for a More Adequate Communicational 
Theory of Organization 
Gareth Morgan (1986) has performed a yeoman service for the sciences of the 
organization by pointing out that, since an organization is a symbolic and not a real 
physical entity, the image we employ to conceptualize it is necessarily dependent on 
our choice of metaphor. Most of the models of organization that have been given 
something like universal credence in the past have tended to emphasize its instrumental 
character, and to make it seem like the analog of a machine, or an organism, or a brain. 
Since machines, and their biological cousins, necessarily have strong communication 
links (in that they would otherwise cease to work), it has often seemed acceptable to 
take organizational communication more or less for granted as well, and to see it as a 
necessary utilitarian "function" responsible for coordination, for transmitting infor- 
mation and for giving commands. If Morgan has succeeded in nothing else, he has at 
least liberated us from the strait-jacket of an outmoded metaphor and left us free to 
range at large, in search of a better conceptual base. In Weick and Browning's (1986) 
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words: "The current study of organizational communication has too much organiza- 
tion and too little communication". We share that view. The issue now is not the 
collection of more data, but a better comprehension of the data we have, through a more 
intelligent application of theory. 
An important part of the research exercise has thus become theory development. 
One promising direction for exploration, we suggest, is to see organization as a 
conversation. Conversations are what create a universe of discourse: they define to 
what people pay attention, how they jointly imagine their world and how they discover 
their own and others' identities within the context of an ongoing negotiation of 
relationships. When you join an organization, you commit yourself to sustaining and 
elaborating on its conversation, to following its rules, to contributing to its documen- 
tary basis and to restructuring your own cognitions to fit its contours. Conversations 
both use and produce texts, and occur in situations which they both define, and are 
defined by. They can be multiplexed, and organized hierarchically, so that there are 
conversations about conversations. They can even take themselves as their own 
subject matter. They are, inour view, thevery fabric of theorganization (Taylor, 1988). 
From the time of Adam Smith on, the utilitarian basis of an organization (its 
nonconversational side, if one prefers) has been, by general agreement, the division of 
labor, well exemplified in its organization chart, or "organigrarnme". When the 
concept of division of labor is re-examined through the metaphorical lens of the 
conversational image, anumber of interesting implications emerge. For one thing, task 
specialization gets translated into dialect opacity: specialized workers develop 
particular vocabularies-dialects or jargon-which simultaneously facilitate conver- 
sation within the local community and render contacts with people outside difficult. 
Dialect variation between groups in an organization is by implication, however, a 
practical guarantee of regions of ambiguity, so that we perceive ambiguity not as an 
aberration, but a necessary corollary of the principle of division of labor. Similarly, 
conversations structure themselves around ongoing themes and are inseparable from 
the communities of people who sustain them by the frequency of their interaction. The 
flip side of interactive intensity is its complement: infrequency, and lack of interaction. 
An organizational conversation, taken as a whole, thus has what might be termed a 
geography, with regions that are densely, and others that are sparsely, settled. 
Conversation, seen as the fabric of complex organization, is nonhomogeneous. 
Finally, a fundamental and well-documented property of all discourse is that it creates 
patterns of us and them, of in-group and out-group. The organizational analog of this 
phenomenon is what is called "displacement of goals" (March & Simon. 1958). The 
effect of the division of labor thus assures more than task specialization: it creates 
interests. An organization is a mixed-motive world: part cooperation, part competi- 
tion. 
The choice of a conversational metaphor for the study of organization has 
numerous practical implications, which have been pointed out in some depth in the 
recent literature and which are of assistance in making sense of the kind of data we have 
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been reporting in this article. Weick (Weick, 1976; 1982; 1985), for example, has 
observed that all organizations are mixtures of tight and loose coupling, a situation 
which cannot be rectified for the simple reason that human beings are limited in their 
information processing and networking capacities, so that every time they move to 
strengthen a link in one part of their network, they will simultaneously weaken a link 
somewhere else. One can only pay attention to a limited number of things at the same 
time.'" It follows further that all behavior in organizations is based on incomplete, even 
fragmentary, information. Decisional rationality as postulated by the classical models 
of game theory and statistical decision theory is based on an impossible premiss: 
complete information. Decision making in real organizations, it has been alleged by 
authors such as March, Olsen, Cohen and others (March & Olsen, 1976; March & 
Weissinger-Baylon, 1986), is fundamentally social in character, in that itrepresents an 
engagement of individuals, confronted with issues, bringing together a range of 
solutions in search of problems, framed within a happenstance conversation, in 
response to an agenda with deadlines whose motivation is frequently arbitrary, and in 
response to a randomly generated calendar of events. An organization, in their view, 
is something like "organized chaos". Environments, these several authors assert, are 
inherently ambiguous and incomprehensible in great depth. Cognitive, decisional 
rationality, in Brunsson's view (Brunsson, 1985), is not very useful in organizations 
precisely because it tends to highlight the opposition of interests therein, whose 
salience, once emphasized, is a barrier to collective action; what works is action 
rationality, namely the kind of logic which emphasizes commonalities of purpose, 
fudging of differences and the building of consensus. Organizations, as we will 
discover in the research reported in this article, are often reluctant to follow paths that 
lead to the division of interests. The business of managers, in at least one view (Kuhn 
& Beam, 1982), and contrary to the conventional wisdom on the subject, is not to 
manage the organization as such (which, given the presence in the latter of a multitude 
of esoteric specialized knowledge bases, is an outlandish notion) but rather to manage 
the management of the organization. From our point of view, this is equivalent to 
saying managing the conversation of the organization. 
What we have been exploring in this paper are some of the implications of adopting 
an approach based on the conversational metaphor to organizational study, as a step 
towards a revised comprehension of the phenomenon of computerization. We have 
med to illustrate some of the incidental effects of loose coupling and what March's 
group calls "garbage can decision making". Our perspective can be seen as having 
important methodological implications, in that we have been required by our theoreti- 
calcommitments to look, as far as possible, toproperties of the conversation-as-a-whole 
of the organization for explanation of the results unearthed in the empirical part of the 
investigation. Our view of conversation led us to observe and record not just the 
multiple visible and audible manifestations of conversation, which is the way conver- 
sation has been traditionally studied in the field of discourse analysis, but also to take 
account of its absence - to be conscious of silences as well as of chatter, reticences 
and the absence of interactional density as well as thick discourse. We take it as 
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axiomatic, with Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967), that to not communicate is 
still to communicate. What we have hied to show is that in the introduction of a new 
technology, what is said (in the form of plans and reactions by those most immediately 
concerned) is no more significant than what is not said. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Research for this article was partly funded by the Canadian Workplace Automation 
Research Centre (CWARC) of the Federal Department of Communications and by 
the Universit6 de Montreal (CAFlR). The opinions expressed in this article are those 
of the authors, and do not necessarily represent an official position of the federal 
government. 
2. Although see Markus, 1983, Hirscheim, 1986, Huber, 1990. For a more complete 
review. see Long, 1987. 
3. It also requires a multiplication of types of report, as we shall see later in the article. 
4. The situation is complicated by the fact that the franchiser is a part owner of a 
number of operations. 
5. For more detailed information, see Rapport Technique prCpart par le Groupe 
d'Intervention Strattgique en Communication Organisatiomelle, UniversitC de 
MontrM, octobre 1988; Implantation bureautique dans une franchise en pharmacie: 
Rapport Scientifique, Aude Dufresne & Jo& Saindon, juin 1989; L'Informatisation 
d'un Rtseau de Franchises: Une ~ t u d e  M-implantation, Mtmoire de Maitrise, 
Universitt de Montrkd, Fran~oise Btlanger, 1990. 
6. To conduct research in this environment is an adventure in flexible planning. In the 
section which follows, we try topresent the steps of research in an orderly manner. 
In practice, considerable extemporization characterizes almost all organizational 
field research. 
7. This may in fact havebeen thereason for their choice, in that it was common practice 
for store operators to consult Parcom when they ran into difficulty with their 
systems. These would then be the franchises best known to Parcom. 
8. More detailed results are furnished in two reports, BClanger 1990 and Dufkesne 
& Saindon, 1989. 
9. The question was phrased as follows: "In order of importance, please indicate the 
task or tasks to which priority should be given in computerization?" 
10.The groupings described in the text were developed through an exploratory factor 
analysis of responses, described in BClanger, 1990. 
11. For definition of policies, refer to the earlier section which describes the practice of 
the franchise operation. 
12.0ne way franchisees have to even out the benefits for loss leaders is to hold back 
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enough of the item to a later, non-sale, week when they can sell it at the regular price 
and hence recuperate what they lost during sale week, when they were actually 
losing money as a result of the below-cost price. The realization that company 
policies cannot eliminate the room to manoeuvre of store operators is captured by 
a head office myth concerning the "Friday night cash register", which is supposed 
to be brought out only when the stores are full of customers, and is supposed to be 
a way of not rendering to the franchiser the full extent of the dues to which he is 
contractually entitled. We could uncover no evidence of a factual basis for the myth; 
it seems to express arecognition of the fundamental mixed-interest character of the 
franchiser-franchisee relationship. 
13. Including, somewhat to our surprise, the role of the supervisor, who is apparently 
seen as having positive as well as punitive functions, in that, as a qualified manager 
himself, his advice on how to run a better operation may be appreciated, particularly 
by less experienced franchise holders. 
14. It should be noted that, given the overall response skew (towards the positive end 
of the pole), a mean of less than 3.0 constitutes a "very strong negative reaction". 
15.A title borrowed from a report written by Fernande Faulkner (1984), in the context 
of the Department of Communication's Office Communication System programme 
(the same programme described in this issue in the article by Clark et al.). 
16.For more detailed review of these previous findings, see (Taylor and Katarnbwe, 
1988;Taylor, forthcoming). 
17. We should perhaps absolve the individuals in the system development group of 
personal blame for this noncommunication. It was evident, for example, that they 
listened attentively to the results of the research project, and incorporated its 
recommendations into their planning. What we are talking about is a tradition, 
which tends to treat computerization as not, as in the old days, a deus ex machina 
but rather, in keeping with the times, amachina ex deo. Technology is treated,both 
by its developers and its users, as a neutral benefit, depersonalized and already 
predefined, rather than as the product of some person or persons somewhere, guided 
by some kinds of understandings, and motivated by some kinds of needs and 
ambitions. This depersonalization strikes us as serious nonsense. Technology is 
situation-specific. 
18. This has been tennedby Friedrnan, the valency of communication (Friedrnan, 1972). 
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